#dusk $DUSK Today I’m reading the Phoenix transaction model documentation by @Dusk , and I got stuck on a basic but easy-to-skip concept about privacy chains: $DUSK ’s protocol layer simply doesn’t have anything called an “account.”
On a transparent chain like Ethereum, each address is an account—balances and transaction history are visible to the whole network. But Phoenix uses a UTXO approach: the protocol layer doesn’t store accounts; it stores a bunch of things called “notes.” Each note contains an amount and a spending condition. A transaction is the process of consuming old notes and producing new notes. The hash of each new note is added to a Merkle tree, whose leaves hold fingerprints of all notes across the network.
The double-spend prevention design gets really interesting here. Each transaction includes a set of deterministic values called “nullifiers.” Each nullifier corresponds to a note that has been consumed, marking it as spent/invalid. But the way nullifiers are generated involves cryptography—an external observer who sees a nullifier appear can tell that “some note was spent,” but cannot link that nullifier to a specific note. The network confirms that the spending (nullification) is valid, but doesn’t know whose note was nullified.
Let me draw an analogy: this isn’t like auditing a bank account, where you flip to a page and can see a person’s entire transaction history. It’s more like crumpling each receipt and throwing it into a shredder, then using encryption to tell the system, “This one has been accounted for.” The system confirms the accounting is valid, but the shredder operator can’t reconstruct the original receipt, nor can they know who that receipt belonged to.
But this design isn’t zero cost either. As the Merkle tree grows with the number of notes, every full node must maintain the complete tree structure. Generating nullifiers relies on underlying cryptographic assumptions—if parameter choices go wrong, privacy protection becomes basically meaningless. The official documentation publishes protocol details, but in production you have to continuously compare the nullifier collision rate and the tree’s growth speed after the mainnet goes live.
Looking at #dusk ’s privacy layer, I won’t just focus on the “uses UTXO” label. What you really want to track is the curve of note growth, the size of the nullifier set, and the storage burden on validating nodes. $DUSK embeds privacy into the protocol layer, but the maintenance cost of the underlying ledger will ultimately show up in overall network performance.
#dusk @Dusk
On a transparent chain like Ethereum, each address is an account—balances and transaction history are visible to the whole network. But Phoenix uses a UTXO approach: the protocol layer doesn’t store accounts; it stores a bunch of things called “notes.” Each note contains an amount and a spending condition. A transaction is the process of consuming old notes and producing new notes. The hash of each new note is added to a Merkle tree, whose leaves hold fingerprints of all notes across the network.
The double-spend prevention design gets really interesting here. Each transaction includes a set of deterministic values called “nullifiers.” Each nullifier corresponds to a note that has been consumed, marking it as spent/invalid. But the way nullifiers are generated involves cryptography—an external observer who sees a nullifier appear can tell that “some note was spent,” but cannot link that nullifier to a specific note. The network confirms that the spending (nullification) is valid, but doesn’t know whose note was nullified.
Let me draw an analogy: this isn’t like auditing a bank account, where you flip to a page and can see a person’s entire transaction history. It’s more like crumpling each receipt and throwing it into a shredder, then using encryption to tell the system, “This one has been accounted for.” The system confirms the accounting is valid, but the shredder operator can’t reconstruct the original receipt, nor can they know who that receipt belonged to.
But this design isn’t zero cost either. As the Merkle tree grows with the number of notes, every full node must maintain the complete tree structure. Generating nullifiers relies on underlying cryptographic assumptions—if parameter choices go wrong, privacy protection becomes basically meaningless. The official documentation publishes protocol details, but in production you have to continuously compare the nullifier collision rate and the tree’s growth speed after the mainnet goes live.
Looking at #dusk ’s privacy layer, I won’t just focus on the “uses UTXO” label. What you really want to track is the curve of note growth, the size of the nullifier set, and the storage burden on validating nodes. $DUSK embeds privacy into the protocol layer, but the maintenance cost of the underlying ledger will ultimately show up in overall network performance.
#dusk @Dusk
你觉得Phoenix的隐私设计比混币器强在哪
100%
隐私链的账本膨胀是不是无解
0%
Dusk和Zcash的隐私模型差别在哪?
0%
1 votes • Voting closed