Last time, another lending agreement liquidated me in an extreme market and I lost much more than I’d expected. Since then, whenever I look at any lending protocol, I make sure to read the liquidation terms first. This time, it’s TermMax.
In most lending protocols, the liquidation logic is: once the collateralization ratio falls below a threshold, the collateral is auctioned on-chain or forcibly sold to repay the debt. The more extreme the market and the worse the liquidity, the larger the liquidation slippage. As a result, borrowers lose more than they would have under the theoretical model—this is why I got burned last time. TermMax adds an option I hadn’t seen before—physical delivery. If there’s severe market volatility or insufficient liquidity, it doesn’t forcibly dump the collateral in a thin market. Instead, it directly delivers the collateral asset itself to the lender as compensation.
My understanding is that this approach separates “liquidation” and “selling.” Traditional DeFi liquidation is basically forced selling. TermMax offers a fallback plan: “Don’t sell—just hand you the thing.” Especially for collateral types like RWA, whose liquidity is inherently worse than mainstream crypto assets, forced selling in extreme conditions may not even be able to realize the theoretical price at all. Physical delivery is like taking a different route to solve the same problem—it doesn’t rely on the market being able to fairly price the collateral at the moment when liquidity is at its worst.
But here’s where I’m being picky: physical delivery means the lender receives not cash, but the asset itself. If the lender originally wanted cash flow, receiving a pile of illiquid collateral is effectively forcing them to take on the burden of managing and handling the asset. Whether that trade-off is worth it depends on how easily the collateral itself can be sold off. The protocol solves the problem of “not being able to sell at a good price during liquidation,” but it doesn’t solve the question of whether the lender actually wants this asset—it simply transfers the decision-making power from the protocol to the lender.
No matter how clever the liquidation mechanism is, the real question is: when extreme market conditions truly hit, can this process run smoothly? Between paper logic and real-world stress testing, this time I want to see how others get burned first—I don’t want to be one of the first batch of guinea pigs again.
What do you think: does a liquidation method like physical delivery really solve the underlying problem of illiquid collateral, or does it just shift the risk from the protocol to the lender?
@TermMax #TermMax
In most lending protocols, the liquidation logic is: once the collateralization ratio falls below a threshold, the collateral is auctioned on-chain or forcibly sold to repay the debt. The more extreme the market and the worse the liquidity, the larger the liquidation slippage. As a result, borrowers lose more than they would have under the theoretical model—this is why I got burned last time. TermMax adds an option I hadn’t seen before—physical delivery. If there’s severe market volatility or insufficient liquidity, it doesn’t forcibly dump the collateral in a thin market. Instead, it directly delivers the collateral asset itself to the lender as compensation.
My understanding is that this approach separates “liquidation” and “selling.” Traditional DeFi liquidation is basically forced selling. TermMax offers a fallback plan: “Don’t sell—just hand you the thing.” Especially for collateral types like RWA, whose liquidity is inherently worse than mainstream crypto assets, forced selling in extreme conditions may not even be able to realize the theoretical price at all. Physical delivery is like taking a different route to solve the same problem—it doesn’t rely on the market being able to fairly price the collateral at the moment when liquidity is at its worst.
But here’s where I’m being picky: physical delivery means the lender receives not cash, but the asset itself. If the lender originally wanted cash flow, receiving a pile of illiquid collateral is effectively forcing them to take on the burden of managing and handling the asset. Whether that trade-off is worth it depends on how easily the collateral itself can be sold off. The protocol solves the problem of “not being able to sell at a good price during liquidation,” but it doesn’t solve the question of whether the lender actually wants this asset—it simply transfers the decision-making power from the protocol to the lender.
No matter how clever the liquidation mechanism is, the real question is: when extreme market conditions truly hit, can this process run smoothly? Between paper logic and real-world stress testing, this time I want to see how others get burned first—I don’t want to be one of the first batch of guinea pigs again.
What do you think: does a liquidation method like physical delivery really solve the underlying problem of illiquid collateral, or does it just shift the risk from the protocol to the lender?
@TermMax #TermMax
解决了真问题,总比在缺流动性市场里贱卖强
只是转嫁风险,贷方未必想要资产本身
得看具体抵押品类型,不能一概而论
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