Blocking the attack entry points and eliminating wrong assumptions are two different things
AEGIS itself emphasizes a very honest distinction: once the critical attack paths are blocked, it doesn’t mean the root cause has been fully redesigned. The Phoenix fee chain can be prevented from growing, halting the chain, and stealing refunds through consistency checks and field binding; deeper design cleanup still belongs to another workstream. Therefore, the security posture is not simply “has holes / no holes.”
I think this kind of framing is more appropriate for financial infrastructure than a one-liner like “the problem is solved.” The goal of urgent mitigation is to quickly reduce real-world risk, while root-cause remediation is to remove erroneous assumptions shared across modules. Their timelines, validation requirements, and migration costs are different. If you mix them into one “completed” checkmark, the market loses the basis for judging the remaining risk.
Good disclosure should explain separately: whether existing exploits are already infeasible; which parts of the code still rely on the old structure; how the forthcoming refactor will be verified; and whether the semantics of historical transactions are affected. That way, users won’t panic over technical jargon, and they also won’t be reassured by oversimplified security slogans.
When I look at the security progress of @Dusk , I see that it records “exploit closure” and “root-cause closure” separately. $DUSK , #dusk : what’s trustworthy isn’t never admitting technical debt, but the fact that each layer of debt has a name, a status, and clear end conditions.
AEGIS itself emphasizes a very honest distinction: once the critical attack paths are blocked, it doesn’t mean the root cause has been fully redesigned. The Phoenix fee chain can be prevented from growing, halting the chain, and stealing refunds through consistency checks and field binding; deeper design cleanup still belongs to another workstream. Therefore, the security posture is not simply “has holes / no holes.”
I think this kind of framing is more appropriate for financial infrastructure than a one-liner like “the problem is solved.” The goal of urgent mitigation is to quickly reduce real-world risk, while root-cause remediation is to remove erroneous assumptions shared across modules. Their timelines, validation requirements, and migration costs are different. If you mix them into one “completed” checkmark, the market loses the basis for judging the remaining risk.
Good disclosure should explain separately: whether existing exploits are already infeasible; which parts of the code still rely on the old structure; how the forthcoming refactor will be verified; and whether the semantics of historical transactions are affected. That way, users won’t panic over technical jargon, and they also won’t be reassured by oversimplified security slogans.
When I look at the security progress of @Dusk , I see that it records “exploit closure” and “root-cause closure” separately. $DUSK , #dusk : what’s trustworthy isn’t never admitting technical debt, but the fact that each layer of debt has a name, a status, and clear end conditions.