TBV’s peg-out redemption mechanism has long been marketed as “trustless and efficient.” But after reading through BitVM3’s challenger design carefully, I got stuck on a very realistic question: if the challengers go collectively offline, how long would it take for the redemption to be credited?
According to the official technical blog, the peg-out process requires a pre-selected set of challengers to verify the operator’s behavior during the voting window; only if no one raises an objection will the redemption be confirmed. But BitVM3 changes the challenger set from an open collection to a closed one. Whether the people in this set can stay online forever, and whether they might be attacked or bribed, becomes a crucial assumption in the system’s security model. If there is no honest challenger response within the window, redemption will be automatically approved—at which point, if the operator misbehaves, the users’ BTC is effectively taken away by an “automated process.”
In the official materials I’ve seen, there isn’t much discussion of scenarios where challengers become non-functional; instead, they emphasize the “cryptographically verifiable” layer. But cryptographic correctness is not the same as operational safety. The latter largely depends on the active participation of that pre-selected group of challengers, and this assumption has not yet been validated through large-scale real-world trials.$BTC
I think when assessing the maturity of the $BABY infrastructure, you can’t look only at the ideal path described in the technical whitepaper—you also need to consider this extreme but real risk of “challenger unavailability,” because it directly affects the most sensitive nerve in the BTC ecosystem: the finality of assets.
#baby @BabylonLabs_io $BABY
According to the official technical blog, the peg-out process requires a pre-selected set of challengers to verify the operator’s behavior during the voting window; only if no one raises an objection will the redemption be confirmed. But BitVM3 changes the challenger set from an open collection to a closed one. Whether the people in this set can stay online forever, and whether they might be attacked or bribed, becomes a crucial assumption in the system’s security model. If there is no honest challenger response within the window, redemption will be automatically approved—at which point, if the operator misbehaves, the users’ BTC is effectively taken away by an “automated process.”
In the official materials I’ve seen, there isn’t much discussion of scenarios where challengers become non-functional; instead, they emphasize the “cryptographically verifiable” layer. But cryptographic correctness is not the same as operational safety. The latter largely depends on the active participation of that pre-selected group of challengers, and this assumption has not yet been validated through large-scale real-world trials.$BTC
I think when assessing the maturity of the $BABY infrastructure, you can’t look only at the ideal path described in the technical whitepaper—you also need to consider this extreme but real risk of “challenger unavailability,” because it directly affects the most sensitive nerve in the BTC ecosystem: the finality of assets.
#baby @BabylonLabs_io $BABY
这个风险确实存在
0%
相信团队会优化
0%
我还没研究到这儿
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0 votes • Voting closed