We always focus our attention on the lockers and the protocol itself, but we overlook an important group of players: the first ones who dared to borrow stablecoins or synthetic assets on the mainnet. Who are they? Why borrow? Can this behavior happen repeatedly?
From the reasoning, the early borrowers were most likely not ordinary retail users, but professional players. For example, cross-venue arbitrageurs who urgently need temporary liquidity to capture price spreads; or managers of on-chain leveraged strategies who need to use BTC as collateral to obtain short-term funding. There are also some miners and OTC merchants who pledge BTC as operating cash flow. These needs share a key characteristic: they are sensitive to interest rates but supported by profit potential. As long as the borrowing cost is lower than the expected arbitrage or operating returns, they are willing to borrow repeatedly. This is what forms a revolving loan loop, rather than a one-off exit from the game.
But if total borrowing costs are pushed too high, or if the yield expectations for LLP are raised too aggressively, it will keep all professional borrowers out, leaving only the “whale” narrative of those who lack the ability to repay. Clearly, that’s not the outcome Babylon wants.
So the observation point should shift: can the first integrated markets like Aave quickly provide competitive interest-rate curves, so that real borrowing activity happens at high frequency? At the same time, can the protocol adjust parameters quickly based on data to avoid choking demand with fees that are too high?
$BTC
Only if there are borrowings happening every day, costs being paid, and a repayment feedback loop, can the dispersed holders of $BABY benefit from fee capture—not by buying time through token inflation. When the mainnet goes live, the first thing everyone should look for is not how much BTC has been locked, but how many assets have been borrowed, how much has been repaid, and how much has been liquidated. Those numbers are the source of BABY’s future gravity.
#baby @BabylonLabs_io $BABY
From the reasoning, the early borrowers were most likely not ordinary retail users, but professional players. For example, cross-venue arbitrageurs who urgently need temporary liquidity to capture price spreads; or managers of on-chain leveraged strategies who need to use BTC as collateral to obtain short-term funding. There are also some miners and OTC merchants who pledge BTC as operating cash flow. These needs share a key characteristic: they are sensitive to interest rates but supported by profit potential. As long as the borrowing cost is lower than the expected arbitrage or operating returns, they are willing to borrow repeatedly. This is what forms a revolving loan loop, rather than a one-off exit from the game.
But if total borrowing costs are pushed too high, or if the yield expectations for LLP are raised too aggressively, it will keep all professional borrowers out, leaving only the “whale” narrative of those who lack the ability to repay. Clearly, that’s not the outcome Babylon wants.
So the observation point should shift: can the first integrated markets like Aave quickly provide competitive interest-rate curves, so that real borrowing activity happens at high frequency? At the same time, can the protocol adjust parameters quickly based on data to avoid choking demand with fees that are too high?
$BTC
Only if there are borrowings happening every day, costs being paid, and a repayment feedback loop, can the dispersed holders of $BABY benefit from fee capture—not by buying time through token inflation. When the mainnet goes live, the first thing everyone should look for is not how much BTC has been locked, but how many assets have been borrowed, how much has been repaid, and how much has been liquidated. Those numbers are the source of BABY’s future gravity.
#baby @BabylonLabs_io $BABY
你觉得首笔借款啥时出现
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多高你会觉得合理
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借款循环是真需求吗
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