Author: Hashrate Index

Original Link: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/z_ADE6vOcBVyx8BzdNM8zA

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Core Summary

  • Bolivia previously experienced a whopping 2,400% surge in hashrate, essentially a pure arbitrage play based on government-subsidized natural gas (subsidized price $1.30/MMBTU compared to international market prices of $8–12) — and the hashrate drop in Q2 2026 indicates that the market has already priced in the expiration of this subsidy policy.


  • The Italian data center group Alps is currently the only operator with a sustainable development logic: they plan to activate a 127MW idle thermal power plant in Cochabamba through a 'dollar settlement, auto-consumption' business model, completely bypassing Bolivia's current currency (Boliviano) exchange rate crisis.


  • Apart from the temporary gas dividends, Bolivia has solid long-term energy assets—including COBEE's 188MW Zongo tiered hydropower, Uyuni's highland solar energy, and Laguna Colorada's geothermal resources—additionally, the new government is actively opening its doors to foreign capital.


  • Bolivia's true opportunity perfectly replicates Paraguay's path to becoming the fourth largest mining country in the world: structural electricity surplus + government willingness to promote legislative frameworks + entry of top institutional capital. Currently, Bolivia has the first two conditions in hand, while Alps is working to build the third condition.


In Latin America, Bolivia's Bitcoin mining story is one of the least known and most easily misread cases.

In the approximately 18 months leading up to early 2026, the country achieved an astonishing leap from 'almost no data available' to 'hash rate year-on-year explosive growth of over 2,400%' on the Hashrate Index global hash rate heat map, becoming one of the fastest-growing mining markets in the world. However, by the second quarter of 2026, this growth momentum began to wane. The divergence between explosive headline data and the subsequent strategic retreat reveals the true nature and limitations of the Bolivian mining market.

Bolivia is not Paraguay. It does not have the long-term structural hydropower surplus brought about by large hydropower stations that have long been fully depreciated (which can drive electricity prices down to near zero marginal costs). Bolivia's trump card lies in its grid structure: 70% of its electricity depends on gas power generation, and the state-owned oil company YPFB provides heavily subsidized prices of up to $1.30/MMBTU. Meanwhile, the trading price in the international LNG market reaches $8–12/MMBTU. This huge price differential has created extremely low industrial electricity prices, generating massive profit opportunities for Bitcoin mining, which have been quickly seized by savvy operators.

However, this arbitrage space has an expiration date. Bolivia is on a path to becoming a net importer of gas within 2-5 years. Once this transformation is completed, the economic foundation supporting the previous hash rate explosion will rapidly deteriorate.

However, Bolivia's energy story has not been concluded by the end of gas subsidies. The Italian data center group Alps is set to collaborate with Qurubiqa to revive a 127MW gas power plant in Cochabamba, which has been idle due to Bolivia's foreign exchange crisis and is basically out of operation. Additionally, Bolivia boasts tiered hydropower, highland solar resources comparable to the Atacama Desert, and a new right-wing government actively seeking to attract foreign capital to alleviate the dollar liquidity crisis. This combination of 'idle industrial energy infrastructure' and 'a government in urgent need of dollar inflows' is the fundamental reason attracting Alps and Qurubiqa to Cochabamba, which also makes Bolivia's mining market far more resilient than the previously mentioned 2,400% explosive growth in the 2026 Latin America Bitcoin Mining Status Report.


Bolivia's National Interconnected Power System (SIN) is managed by CNDC (National Load Dispatch Center) and regulated by AETN (Electricity and Nuclear Technology Regulatory Authority). Since 2010, the country's electricity demand has grown by 85%, soaring from 5,664GWh to about 10,450GWh in 2024. The state-owned power company ENDE Corporacion is the absolute dominant operator, with its subsidiary ENDE Andina accounting for 57% of the entire system's power generation input.

1. Thermal Power Center


ENDE Andina's three power plants in Cochabamba, Tarija, and Santa Cruz are the backbone of Bolivia's power grid. These plants use combined cycle gas technology to maximize the electricity generation efficiency of each cubic meter of gas sourced from YPFB's subsidized gas.

Termoelectrica Entre Rios | Cochabamba | 526.77 MW

Termoelectrica del Sur | Tarija Aiqua | 505.83 MW

Termoelectrica Warnes | Santa Cruz Warnes | 527.41 MW

Gas is supplied by YPFB at approximately $1.30/MMBTU according to the domestic subsidy pricing mechanism. In contrast, international LNG prices have long fluctuated between $8 and $12/MMBTU. This price difference of up to $6.70-10.70/MMBTU is both the source of Bolivia's low industrial electricity prices and a structural vulnerability determining its mid-term energy landscape.

2. Renewable Energy Sector


Although Bolivia's renewable energy assets are limited in scale, they are of high quality. The COBEE Zongo hydropower system (operating since the 1930s, consisting of 10 Pelton turbine power stations on the Zongo River, totaling 188MW) as well as ENDE Corani's Misicuni project (120MW) and San Jose hydropower (124MW) together constitute about 472MW of hydropower capacity with marginal costs close to zero. These high-quality assets form the cornerstone of Bolivia's long-term, robust mining opportunities.

In terms of wind and solar energy, ENDE Guaracachi operates three wind farms in Santa Cruz, totaling 108MW, equipped with 30 Vestas 3.6MW units; while in the Uyuni salt flat at an altitude of over 3,700 meters, there is a 62.5MW solar project (this project requires IP54 protection-rated equipment and specific inverter derating designs due to the high-altitude environment). Additionally, the Laguna Colorada in Potosi has a 5MW geothermal pilot plant, with long-term plans to expand to 100MW. Although these new energy assets currently lack storage integration and sufficient grid connectivity to provide baseload power for industrial-scale mining farms around the clock, once battery storage policies catch up, they will become the most solid long-term bottom support.

3. Structural Crisis: Countdown to Gas Depletion


Bolivia's gas reserves are being consumed at a pace far exceeding the exploration and discovery of new gas fields. The country's thermal power facilities consume about 1.5 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Bolivia is expected to become a net importer of gas within 2-5 years, and the government is even studying how to utilize existing infrastructure in Tarija to reverse transport shale gas from Argentina's Vaca Muerta.

The financial accounts behind this are very severe: if calculated at international market import prices, the annualized electricity costs of operating the current thermal power fleet will increase by about $4. Meanwhile, the annual total profit of the state-owned power company ENDE is only about $160 million. This means the balance must tip—either industrial electricity prices will rise significantly, or the national treasury will be forced to swallow an unbearable structural energy deficit, or the power generation structure will completely de-gasify. For miners based on subsidized thermal electricity prices, the window of opportunity is closing.

By early 2026, Bolivia's hash rate is expected to achieve a 2,400% year-on-year explosive growth, which is essentially a rational choice for capital chasing a certainty price differential. Miners discovered subsidized electricity priced at only about $0.03-0.06 per kWh, quickly deploying machines to enter the market and attempting to complete this arbitrage before macro conditions change. The decline in hash rate in the second quarter of 2026 is precisely the market hedging risks ahead of the official announcement of the end of the subsidy policy.

This dynamic is not uncommon in the industry. Over the past decade, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Kosovo have all experienced identical scripts: specific policy dividends created electricity price troughs that attracted massive mining capital, only for governments to adjust prices or limit access under pressure, leading to rapid outflows of hash rate. Most operators that triggered the 2,400% explosion were merely capturing short-term dividends rather than deeply cultivating infrastructure.

Therefore, the key issue in Bolivia's mining market is: after the feverish arbitrage tide recedes, does a solid asset with cyclical resistance still remain at the bottom? The answer entirely depends on whether private capital can directly take over those trapped industrial energy assets with a dollar-denominated business model before the gas subsidies collapse.


Among the fluctuating hash rate landscape in Bolivia, one operator stands out. The Italian mining and data center company Alps, co-founded by CEO Francesco Buffa and CFO Francesca Failoni, did not come to Bolivia to blindly chase subsidized gas electricity. Instead, Alps chose to partner with local company Qurubiqa to revitalize a completely idle 127MW gas-fired power plant in the Cochabamba region—a typical 'trapped asset' that became a wasteland due to Bolivia's exchange rate crisis. This gives Alps a first-mover advantage, leading the country's first large-scale 'auto-consumption' mining project, directly paying for electricity in dollars, exactly meeting the Bolivian government's urgent need to revitalize such assets.

This business logic is fundamentally different from other operators in the country chasing short-term dividends.

Cochabamba's breaking point: Using Bitcoin mining to crack the exchange rate deadlock

The 127MW thermal power plant that Alps has locked in was previously caught in a structural paradox: when purchasing natural gas raw materials, the plant must pay in dollars, but when selling electricity to the Bolivian national grid, it can only receive local currency Bolivianos at the official exchange rate of 7:1. However, the actual market exchange rate has already fallen to 12-13:1. Under such a significant exchange rate distortion, the plant incurs losses as soon as it operates. Thus, the plant's shutdown is not due to technical failures but because Bolivia's currency system has rendered its operation economically unreasonable.

The 'Auto-consumption' model introduced by Alps has completely untangled this deadlock. By directly feeding the electricity generated by power plants into Bitcoin miners, Alps is able to pay the power plants in hard currency dollars at the agreed price, providing operators with valuable stable foreign exchange. For the Bolivian government, which urgently needs dollar inflows to safeguard its foreign reserves, this brings an industrial user that can reliably bring in foreign exchange and revitalize idle assets. Both parties completely bypass the distorted Boliviano exchange rate quagmire.

"If Bolivia can learn from the lessons of other markets and reject speculative small miners, it will face a tremendous opportunity for breakthrough. The core dividend here is not the gas subsidy, but rather that we can genuinely help Bolivia solve its core economic pain points through a win-win business model." — Francesco Buffa, CEO of Alps


Alps' first phase goal is to activate 30MW capacity at the Cochabamba site, with machines being relocated directly from their existing mining farm in Paraguay. This pragmatic decision solves two pain points: on one hand, it reduces idle capital in Paraguay amid tightening regulations and increasing competition, while on the other, it injects mature hardware assets directly into Bolivia without having to go through the complex clearance process for new equipment.

Their roadmap for scaling up is highly ambitious: Alps plans to increase capacity to 45MW by the end of 2026, maximizing the load operation of a single turbine unit at the Cochabamba plant. Their ultimate goal is to capture the entire 127MW capacity, making Alps the undisputed top mining giant in Bolivia and one of the largest mining farms in South America (excluding Paraguay).

Additionally, two new sites are under evaluation: one in the highland area near La Paz, and the other near the Argentine border, both of which are expected to connect to different energy structures and logistics channels.


In the mining market, there is a chasm-like difference between 'first movers' and 'early entrants.' Speculators only profit from initial arbitrage price differentials and exit as soon as conditions change; while first movers are committed to building infrastructure, streamlining government-business relationships, and thoroughly understanding the regulatory environment, thereby solidifying themselves as long-term core barriers.

Alps can be defined as a first mover in Bolivia for three reasons: Firstly, its 'auto-consumption' model implemented at industrial thermal power plants differs fundamentally from those small players directly accessing the ENDE grid and enjoying subsidized electricity prices. Since they negotiate directly with a single power plant rather than relying on national electricity price fluctuations, they can survive the subsequent collapse of gas subsidies; secondly, Alps has established direct dialogue channels with the new government through its local partner Parak, even reaching the Bolivian Ministry of Economy, giving them significant influence in regulatory rule-making; thirdly, the company has positioned Bolivia as its number one growth market globally, rather than a secondary backup option, with its core capital and executive focus shifting towards Bolivia in 2026.



Operating in Bolivia is by no means easy; Alps admits there are numerous frictions throughout the process. As a landlocked country, transporting ASIC miners to Bolivia must rely on complex multimodal logistics: goods first arrive by sea at Pacific/Atlantic ports in Argentina or Brazil, then are transported via the Paraguay-Parana inland waterway to Puerto Jennefer, and finally trucked overland to construction sites like Cochabamba. Notably, the 30 Vestas 3.6MW giant wind turbines previously used at the Santa Cruz wind farm were also delivered via this route, proving that this logistics chain is fully capable of handling the cross-border transport of oversized industrial goods.

In terms of customs policy, the new Bolivian government has eliminated import tariffs on ASIC miners, which is a significant policy benefit. However, a 15% value-added tax (VAT) still exists and cannot be deducted. For large containers of mining machines, this 15% hard cost cannot be optimized away. Alps emphasizes that the cumbersome customs approval and clearance process is a major pain point in current operations. For multinational miners accustomed to a simple import environment, Bolivia's bureaucratic customs practices present a high invisible barrier that can only be smoothed out through local experience and deep connections, and cannot be completely bypassed.

Aside from Alps, the current mining landscape in Bolivia is mainly composed of small to medium-sized retail miners. Most of them rushed in during the gas subsidy window, and with the upcoming electricity price adjustments, these retail miners' risk tolerance is extremely weak. The previous +2,400% year-on-year explosive growth reflected the tactics of many small fleets capturing short-term price differentials, rather than institutional players building permanent infrastructure.

The Paraguayan market underwent a major reshuffle between 2022 and 2024 (during which institutional players and speculative retail traders were forcibly separated by significantly raising the electricity price threshold and introducing margin requirements), and while this period of pain has not yet occurred in Bolivia, it is inevitable. Once Bolivia's thermal electricity prices start to return to real market costs, miners who cannot directly access idle 'trapped assets' or long-term quality new energy contracts will replay the scenario where mid-tier miners were cleared from Paraguay. Those who can survive will only be institutional players like Alps, who entered the generation source early, locked in dollar-settled auto-consumption agreements, and are immune to the overall fluctuations of national electricity prices.

The real opportunity that transcends cycles: New energy assets beyond thermal power


For strategic miners willing to look long-term, Bolivia offers highly competitive low-cost new energy assets. COBEE's Zongo tiered hydropower system has been operating since the 1930s and can provide 188MW of clean power at nearly zero marginal cost. Signing long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) with COBEE is arguably one of the most structurally robust energy solutions in South America, aside from Paraguay.

Despite facing technical challenges in highland engineering (such as the need to procure equipment with IP54 protection rating, strict derating limits for inverters due to thin air, and special heat management), the photovoltaic resources of the Uyuni salt flat have extremely favorable solar radiation conditions. With future battery storage policies being implemented and the grid integrating large-capacity storage, highland photovoltaics will have the capability to support continuous and stable operation of mining farms. The geothermal pilot project at Laguna Colorada (currently 5MW, with long-term plans for 100MW) represents the country's most reliable long-term baseload asset: 24/7 output, zero fuel price volatility risk, perfectly utilizing Bolivia's unique volcanic geological advantages.

The shift in Bolivia's political landscape towards a right-wing government has fundamentally reshaped the rules of engagement for private capital in the energy sector. The previous government had a strong national monopoly bias towards new energy and foreign capital introduction, vehemently resisting market-based pricing. The new administration views foreign capital as a core strategy to resolve the foreign exchange liquidity crisis and has demonstrated strong action: eliminating tariffs on ASIC miners, establishing the legal framework for the auto-consumption model that Alps is using, and proactively initiating direct dialogues with large foreign miners.

The partner of Alps in Bolivia has taken up a key cabinet minister position, marking a significant directional event. Currently, Bolivia has not yet established a mature normalized legal framework for industrial-scale Bitcoin mining by creating a dedicated GCIE industrial electricity category, as Paraguay did. This means the game rules are still being formulated in real-time. At this moment, pioneers already operating in the market, who can directly negotiate with government departments, will deeply participate in and shape the future regulatory boundaries, an advantage that later entrants cannot reach.

As Francesco clearly pointed out, the current significant risk lies in Bolivia attracting too many speculative, substandard miners, which could trigger a political backlash, forcing the government to impose punitive electricity prices and harsh margin thresholds like Paraguay did back in the day. Therefore, beyond its own commercial interests, Alps' greatest long-term contribution to Bolivia's mining industry is to demonstrate to the government that industrial-scale miners capable of bringing in real dollar investments, employing local staff, and deeply cultivating industrial assets should be the model that the government protects and encourages with laws and policies.

Bolivia's 2,400% surge in hash rate is a shortsighted arbitrage, but the long-term mining dividends in Bolivia are by no means a castle in the air.

This country has industrial energy assets trapped by systemic distortions, a government desperate for dollar inflows, a regulatory window open to foreign investment, and at least one major player (Alps) entering with the right business model at the right time.

The structural risks here should not be overlooked: gas depletion is a reality that is occurring; the exchange rate distortions that led to the shutdown of the Cochabamba power plant reflect deep-seated fiscal ailments that are difficult to cure in the short term; customs clearance frictions are a necessary part of daily operations; and the lack of clear long-term industrial-scale mining regulations means that asset deployment rules concerning hundreds of millions of dollars are still in the exploratory phase.

However, the breakthrough point that Alps has hit is real and enlightening: a 127MW thermal power plant that could not operate commercially under Bolivia's distorted currency regime has transformed into a superpower engine that can solve dollar repayments for the plant owner, create hard currency foreign exchange for the country, and provide complete immunity for the mining farm against the risks of declining national gas subsidies. This underlying logic is fundamentally different from the speculative mentality that previously drove the 2,400% arbitrage wave, and only this logic can solidify a truly robust hash rate foundation.

Paraguay becoming the fourth largest Bitcoin mining country in the world is no coincidence. It is the result of the resonance of structural electricity surplus, the government's determination to promote industrial consumption legislation, and the entry of institutional capital at the same historical juncture. Now, Bolivia has the first two conditions in hand. The third condition is being built from ideal to reality through Alps' continuous efforts.