Conclusion first: Recently, there have been no technical failures with Ethereum's cross-chain; all issues are concentrated on security vulnerabilities of third-party cross-chain bridges. The Kelp DAO incident on April 18th is the largest DeFi attack to date in 2026, triggering systemic risk; the Verus bridge attack on May 18th is the latest. All issues have clear solutions, but cross-chain security remains a long-term challenge for the industry.
I. Recent two major cross-chain events
1. April 18th Kelp DAO rsETH cross-chain bridge attack (losses ≈ $293 million)
This is the most impactful incident, primarily due to a configuration vulnerability in the LayerZero cross-chain protocol, not an issue with Ethereum itself.
- Attack Mechanism: Kelp DAO utilized LayerZero with a 1/1 single-signature DVN (Decentralized Validation Network) setup, meaning if one validation node was compromised, it could forge cross-chain messages. The hacker infiltrated this sole validation node and minted 116,500 rsETH out of thin air on the Ethereum mainnet without destroying any assets on the source chain (Unichain), representing 18% of total circulation.
- Fatal Flaw: The hacker did not directly sell rsETH (due to low liquidity) but used these "air assets" as collateral in mainstream lending protocols like Aave V3, Compound V3, and Euler, borrowing around $236 million in real ETH/WETH, leading to massive bad debt risks for these protocols.
- Impact Scope:
- Direct Impact: Approximately 116,500 rsETH holders have insufficient asset backing.
- Indirect Impact: Depositors in lending protocols like Aave face a risk of bank runs, with rsETH prices plummeting by 40%.
- Systemic Impact: Exposed the risk transmission chain of "cross-chain bridges + liquidity re-staking + lending" combinations, triggering panic across the entire DeFi market.
2. May 18 Verus-Ethereum Bridge Attack (Loss ≈ $11.58 million)
The latest incident revolves around a logic flaw in the cross-chain bridge.
- Attack Mechanism: The hacker submitted a forged cross-chain import payload, bypassing the bridge's validation mechanism. The bridge executed the transfer command without confirming whether the source chain's assets were truly locked, directly transferring ETH, tBTC v2, and USDC from reserves to the hacker's wallet.
- Impact Scope: Only affects users utilizing that bridge, with no spillover to other protocols. The Verus team has committed to fully compensating affected users.
2. Core Issues Root Cause (Not Ethereum's Problem)
All recent cross-chain issues stem from design or configuration flaws in third-party cross-chain infrastructure and are unrelated to the Ethereum mainnet's consensus or security:
1. Single Point Validation Risk: Many projects use single-signature or minimal node validation (like Kelp DAO's 1/1 DVN) to cut costs and delays, and if a single node is compromised, the entire bridge collapses.
2. Verification and Execution Disconnection: The validation module and execution module of the cross-chain bridge are not fully bound, leading to inconsistencies between validated messages and actual executed content (as seen with the Verus bridge).
3. Configuration Management Negligence: Developers did not follow security best practices, mishandling private key storage (as in the Syndicate incident) or using insecure default configurations.
3. Impact Severity Assessment
Event Fund Loss Systemic Impact User Impact Scope Recovery Difficulty
Kelp DAO $293 million High (affecting mainstream protocols like Aave) Wide (rsETH holders + lending protocol users) Medium (multi-party compensation coordination)
Verus Bridge $1.158 million Low (no spillover) Narrow (only bridge users) Low (project team fully backs)
Syndicate Bridge $380,000 Extremely Low Very Narrow Low (fully compensated)
Key Notes:
- The Ethereum mainnet and official L2 cross-chain bridges (the official bridges of Arbitrum, Optimism, and Base) are operating normally, with no security issues.
- Affected projects are all small third-party cross-chain bridges or projects using third-party cross-chain protocols.
- Currently, all affected projects have committed to fully compensating users, and the compensation plan for the Kelp DAO incident is in progress. Arbitrum DAO has voted to release over 30,000 ETH to restore asset backing for rsETH.
4. Solutions and Progress
1. Completed Temporary Measures
- Kelp DAO: Has suspended cross-chain bridge functions, migrating to the Chainlink CCIP cross-chain standard, no longer using LayerZero's single-signature configuration.
- LayerZero: Has mandated that all new projects use at least a 3/5 multi-signature DVN setup and provided security audit tools.
- Lending protocols like Aave have removed rsETH from collateral lists and raised the liquidation thresholds for other cross-chain assets.
2. Long-term Solutions
- Ethereum Native Interoperability Layer: The Ethereum Interop Layer proposed by Vitalik is in design, aiming to make cross-L2 transactions as seamless as on the same chain, without relying on third-party bridges.
- ZK Cross-chain Technology: Zero-knowledge proof-based cross-chain bridges are becoming mainstream, replacing intermediary nodes with mathematical verification, significantly increasing the difficulty of attacks.
- Industry Standards: Multiple organizations are establishing security standards for cross-chain bridges, mandating the use of multi-signature verification, dual-validation mechanisms, and more.
5. Recommendations for Regular Users
1. Prioritize Official Cross-Chain Bridges: The official bridges of L2s like Arbitrum, Optimism, and Base are directly maintained by the project teams, offering far greater security than third-party bridges.
2. Avoid Using Niche Cross-Chain Bridges: Don’t risk saving a few bucks on fees or time by using unknown cross-chain bridges.
3. Do Not Hold Cross-Chain Assets Long-Term: After cross-chain completion, promptly convert assets to native assets to avoid losses from potential bridge issues.
4. Large Asset Transfers in Batches: If transferring large amounts, do it in multiple transactions to lower the risk per transfer.
Do you need me to help you compile a whitelist of secure cross-chain bridges, indicating which are official bridges and which are third-party bridges that have undergone multiple audits?
