After Unitree Technology went public, a widely circulated claim was that Lei Jun made more than 10 billion yuan by “applying for the new shares of Unitree.”

In a livestream on September 21, Lei Jun clarified two points: the investment entity was Shunwei Capital, not him personally; and the money belonged to early-stage angel investors and venture capital, not to applying for new shares in an IPO.

This isn’t just a dispute over wording. It points to a more pressing question: an institution made an investment decision years before the company listed, and later its value of the shares rose significantly. How, exactly, should this return be calculated—and who does it belong to?

【Key decisions happened in 2021, not on the day of the listing】

Shunwei Capital has publicly disclosed that it led the Series A round financing of Yushu Technology in 2021, and continued to support in the subsequent Series B round. Shunwei did not list on the STAR Market until August 19, 2026, with the securities code 688836.

Therefore, the starting point of this investment path is not subscribing to a new IPO share, but entering the primary market about five years before listing.

The two face different risks. IPO new-share subscription is aimed at a company that has already completed filing, review, and issue-price setting. Early-stage investment, by contrast, is for a company that has not yet listed, whose equity lacks liquidity, and whose commercialization and exit timing are both uncertain. At that time, investors could choose not to invest, wait for a more mature financing round, or enter early and bear a longer period of uncertainty.

Public information can only confirm that Shunwei chose to enter early and continue to support in later rounds; it cannot be used to fabricate any internal discussions or management motivations. But this timing itself already indicates that any later, larger book gains would correspond to risks in technology, the market, and exit that were assumed earlier—not to a one-time low-price subscription opportunity at the time of listing.

【“Increase in market value” to “personal profit,” with at least four layers in between】

To understand this investment, you must first distinguish four parties: Lei Jun the individual, the fund managed by Shunwei, the fund contributors, and Xiaomi. They cannot be merged and calculated as a single entity just because they are related.

Venture capital funds are typically responsible for investment decisions by the manager, while the money mainly comes from the fund contributors—i.e., LPs. After the investee company goes public, even if the relevant shares show unrealized book gains based on market prices, those gains first belong to the corresponding shareholding entity and do not automatically become any individual cash income of a particular manager.

To turn book figures into actual returns, multiple steps are involved: how many shares are currently held; whether the shares are subject to a lock-up period; when and at what price the shares are reduced/sold; what taxes and transaction costs must be borne; and how the fund agreement allocates returns between the LPs and the manager.

The prospectus materials for Yushu also show that the shareholding percentages of Shunwei-related entities—Astrend IV—changed at different financing and transfer milestones in 2024. This means early shares may be diluted by new financing, and transfers may also occur. Multiplying a historical shareholding percentage by the share price on a particular day cannot directly yield the current shares available for sale, and it cannot be used to assert that Lei Jun the individual has “already earned over RMB 10 billion.”

【The issue price, the market price, and realized returns are not the same number】

Yushu’s IPO issue price was RMB 150.80 per share, issuing 40.4464 million shares to raise approximately RMB 6.099 billion. These data describe the new share issuance, but they cannot answer the early investors’ costs and final returns.

The issue price is not the purchase cost of early shareholders; the intraday post-listing price also does not equal their actual selling price. Using the share price at a certain time multiplied by the number of shares held can at most produce a book market value estimate under a specific calculation standard. Only after shares are actually disposed of, and related costs and taxes are deducted, and then after distribution is completed according to the fund agreement, can realized returns and their attribution be further discussed.

At present, publicly available materials can confirm the investment nature and a rough path, but they are insufficient to provide a unified answer to “how much profit was made.” The specific shareholding percentages, investment costs, lock-up and selling plans, and the fund distribution outcome should still be based on the formal disclosures from the fund and the listed company.

【Early investment can pay off—but comes with the cost of waiting and volatility】

Yushu’s operational growth provides the company-level foundation for book value appreciation from early investments. The exchange’s review reply shows that Yushu’s operating revenue grew from RMB 159.1344 million in 2023 to RMB 1,699.2693 million in 2025.

However, the same set of materials also discloses that in the first quarter of 2026, the net profit after deducting non-recurring gains and losses declined year-on-year by 52.55%, and it also notes that performance volatility could be caused by factors such as the commercialization of general-purpose robots, market demand, technical competition, and growth in expenses.

This is the two sides of early-stage investment outcomes. Investors may achieve higher book returns due to the company’s rapid growth, but they must also bear uncertainties in the technology roadmap, commercialization progress, competitive landscape, and the exit cycle. Going public is an important milestone, but it is not the end point where all risks disappear and all gains are cashed out.

Finally, you must draw a boundary: Shunwei’s financial investment cannot automatically be inferred as deep business synergy between Xiaomi and Yushu. Whether there are purchases, joint R&D, channel cooperation, or other industrial relationships needs to be separately verified through publicly available company-level evidence.

So, “Lei Jun’s IPO subscription of Yushu earned over RMB 10 billion” at least conflates three things: describing early-stage primary-market investment as IPO new-share subscription; mistaking fund shareholding for personal shareholding; and equating book market value with realized cash returns. What is truly worth observing is not a huge number derived from a single day’s share price, but whether subsequent disclosures can show changes in shareholding, lock-up and selling arrangements, and whether Yushu’s revenue growth can be converted into more stable profitability.

For research and study only and does not constitute investment advice.