Sui's Hashi goes live: how hBTC is actually secured, and what you give up to use it
Hashi, the bitcoin bridge built for Sui, went live on mainnet on 19 November. It keeps your BTC on the Bitcoin network and mints the same amount of hBTC on Sui. So how is hBTC secured? According to Hashi's own design docs, every deposit address can only be spent by two parties together: a committee drawn from Sui's validators, signing jointly so no single member holds the key, and a second signer called the Guardian that runs inside a cloud enclave. You are not trusting one custodian. You are trusting the committee and the Guardian together, with a 60-day backstop explained below.
We read the docs so you don't have to. Here is what using it actually involves.
One deposit, step by step
You start on Sui, not on Bitcoin. Hashi gives every Sui address its own Bitcoin deposit address, a Taproot address derived from your Sui address and the committee's public key. The docs are blunt about what that means: your own wallet keys do not control it.
You then send BTC to that address from any Bitcoin wallet. The minimum is a governance setting, 30,000 satoshis (0.0003 BTC) by default. Send less and the contract rejects the request.
Next comes a step that is easy to miss. Hashi does not watch Bitcoin for you. You have to record the deposit on Sui yourself, passing the Bitcoin transaction ID, either through the Hashi command-line tool or its TypeScript SDK. If you forget, the docs say the BTC is not lost. It simply sits at your deposit address until you file the request.
Then you wait through three stages. The funding transaction needs six Bitcoin confirmations by default, which the docs put at about an hour. Committee members then vote to approve, and on mainnet each member that has a TRM Labs key screens both the Bitcoin transaction and your Sui address. After approval, a 10-minute delay must pass before anyone can trigger the mint. That window exists so operators can spot a bad approval and pause the system first. A request not confirmed within 24 hours expires, and you can submit it again.
Add those up and a deposit takes a little over an hour in normal conditions. Hashi charges no protocol fee on deposits. You pay only Sui gas.
One withdrawal, step by step
Going back is a single request on Sui: an amount of at least 30,000 satoshis and a Bitcoin address, which must be a modern bc1q or bc1p type. Older address formats are not supported. Your hBTC is pulled into the request, and the docs track it through five states, from Requested to Confirmed.
There is no fixed time for this. Your request waits for committee approval, then for a leader node to batch it with others, then for room in the Guardian's rate limiter, a token bucket that caps how much BTC can leave over time, and finally for Bitcoin confirmations. A request bigger than the bucket's maximum is skipped until governance raises the limit, which is one of the reasons the docs give for cancelling. You can cancel while the request is still Requested or Approved, after a cooldown of an hour by default, and get the full hBTC back.
The cost is the Bitcoin miner fee for your share of the transaction, taken from the BTC you receive. Again, no protocol fee. The docs note that someone withdrawing exactly the minimum could, in the worst case, receive a 546-satoshi output.
Who actually holds the bitcoin
The committee holds a shared signing key through threshold multi-party computation. The protocol assumes at most one third of committee voting weight is offline or hostile, and key handovers need two thirds of the new committee to sign off. When Sui's validator set changes, the key moves to the new committee, and withdrawals pause while that happens.
The Guardian is the check on the committee. Every spend from a deposit address needs a 2-of-2 signature, one from the committee and one from the Guardian, so the docs say a compromised committee cannot move funds on its own. The Guardian's own key is split among separate key holders using hardware security keys, and its enclave writes signed logs to storage.
Then there is the backstop. If the Guardian key is ever lost, a recovery path lets the committee alone spend any deposit 60 days after it confirmed, so coins cannot be stranded. Read the other way, for coins that sit untouched for 60 days, the Guardian's veto no longer applies. The docs say the protocol prefers spending deposits older than about 30 days when it funds withdrawals, which narrows that gap without closing it.
Governance follows stake. Changing settings takes two thirds of committee weight, while 5% of weight can trigger an emergency pause. The docs say there is no HASHI token and treat any offer of one as an imitation.
What the docs don't tell you
A few things we could not answer from public material as of 20 November.
The docs describe an "operator" that sets up and activates the Guardian enclave, but they do not say who that operator is. They also give default values, not the live mainnet settings for the rate limiter's capacity. We found no list of which validators sit on the committee at launch, and no audit report linked from the docs. And if a quorum declines a deposit after screening, the BTC stays at an address the depositor cannot spend; we found no stated process for getting it back.
The Sui Foundation says more than 20 partners are building around Hashi, including Anchorage Digital and the lending protocol Fluid, which is taking hBTC as collateral for USDC loans, per The Block. Those integrations sit on top of the model above, and they don't change who holds the keys.
Sources
Hashi design docs
hBTC common questions
Guardian
Handling sanctioned addresses
Configuration
Sui blog: Hashi Mainnet is Live
Hashi homepage
The Block
