The blame for the "one paste" that hit 178 sites, including HSBC, BBC, and Ledger, lands on Optimizely, the third-party testing platform that was the common point of failure. The websites were victims of a supply-chain attack, not the architects of it. The attack did not breach 178 separate companies. It exploited a single flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation, a tool used for A/B testing. Attackers found a vulnerability in the account signup flow, which allowed them to inject malicious JavaScript into the Project JavaScript field of customer projects. Because websites load this code directly from Optimizely's trusted servers, the malicious script was served to visitors with the platform's own security certificate. Optimizely confirmed the incident and stated the vulnerable path is now blocked. Ledger's website was among the 178 affected, which is alarming given its role as a hardware wallet manufacturer. But it is crucial to distinguish between the website layer and the device layer. The malware targeted the website, attempting to swap crypto addresses in the browser and clipboard. There is no evidence that Ledger's hardware, firmware, or private keys were compromised. The hardware wallet's trusted display is designed to show the true destination address on the device itself. While Optimizely is the technical root cause, the incident highlights a shared responsibility model. Companies trusted a third-party vendor whose security failed, and their websites served malware to users. Supply-chain security is a critical part of a company's own security posture. For users, the defense is to always verify the destination address on a trusted, separate screen, like a hardware wallet's display, rather than relying on what a website shows.