ZachXBT flags Lazarus as top Kruw CoinJoin user — should coordinators face scrutiny? Blockchain sleuth ZachXBT has publicly accused North Korea’s Lazarus Group of being the largest user of Kruw’s Bitcoin CoinJoin coordinator — and questioned whether Kruw’s operator should be held to account after the operator touted that his users consume about 1.6% of Bitcoin’s blockspace. What kicked this off On Nov. 17, Kruw posted that users of his coordinator accounted for roughly 1.6% of Bitcoin blockspace, referencing an earlier Aug. 5 post that put the figure at 1.1%. Neither post explained the time window or methodology behind the percentages. ZachXBT replied on X, pointing to Arkham Intelligence tracing that links a tranche of funds from the September Bitget hack — attributed on-chain to Lazarus — into CoinJoin transactions coordinated with the WabiSabi protocol. “Posting this while fully knowing your largest ‘user’ is currently Lazarus Group laundering hundreds of millions from exploits?” he wrote. What the on-chain tracing shows Arkham’s thread tracked Bitcoin flows tied to wallets labeled as the Bitget hacker. Key figures from its Nov. 16 analysis: - 2,173.76 BTC (about $154.45 million) entered CoinJoin transactions during the tracked period. Of that, 2,065.43 BTC went straight into WabiSabi CoinJoin rounds; 108.33 BTC first moved to newly created addresses before entering CoinJoin. - Across an 11-day window, 2,266.68 BTC ($161.04 million) left the labeled wallets. The CoinJoin amount represents roughly 95.9% of those outflows. - Daily movements included 351.96 BTC on Nov. 14, 316.35 BTC on Nov. 15, and 77.07 BTC recorded for Nov. 16 (of which 55 BTC entered six CoinJoin rounds). - Since Nov. 6, the labeled wallets averaged about 206.06 BTC in outflows per day. Only 34.63 BTC (~$2.25 million) remained in the tracked wallets at the time of reporting. Arkham cautioned that its figures describe coins entering CoinJoin transactions; they do not exclusively attribute all of those CoinJoin rounds to a single coordinator. It also noted that fresh addresses tied to the flow could still belong to the attacker, and that some transfers mixed labeled and unlabeled inputs — meaning funds might then pass through OTC desks or other laundering services. Past intelligence and wider context This is not the first time Kruw.io has been linked to Lazarus activity. A June 2025 U.S. Secret Service alert specifically named Kruw.io as a service used by the group, saying Lazarus had mixed roughly $14.3 million there and was using it to launder proceeds from the $1.5 billion Bybit theft. The alert described Kruw.io as one of the most active post‑zkSNACKs services offering CoinJoin coordination after zkSNACKs halted its own coordinator. That shut-down of a major coordinator in May 2024 sparked public debate about privacy tooling in Bitcoin. Privacy advocates, including Edward Snowden, urged developers to consider privacy at the protocol level rather than leaving it to overlay services and coordinators. Regulatory and legal fallout for coordinators and privacy services Law enforcement has already prosecuted operators of privacy-enhancing services when they are found to have facilitated criminal proceeds. The U.S. Department of Justice in 2025 announced guilty pleas and sentencing for Samourai Wallet founders Keonne Rodriguez and William Lonergan Hill, saying they knowingly transmitted more than $237 million in criminal proceeds through their service. Rodriguez was sentenced to five years in prison (Nov. 6, 2025), Hill to four years (Nov. 19, 2025). Prosecutors said the duo actively marketed the service to criminals and encouraged use of Whirlpool; the DOJ noted that more than 80,000 BTC passed through Whirlpool and Ricochet, generating over $6 million in fees. Each founder also received supervised release, fines, and forfeiture tied to fees earned by the service. Why this matters The current standoff highlights an unresolved question for Bitcoin’s privacy ecosystem: where does responsibility lie when privacy tools are used to launder stolen funds? Operators of CoinJoin coordinators argue they provide legitimate privacy protections to many users. But regulators and investigators point to cases where the same tools are repurposed by state-backed actors or criminal groups to obfuscate theft. ZachXBT’s public challenge to Kruw — and Arkham’s detailed tracing — put pressure on coordinator operators to be transparent about usage and potential abuse. Kruw’s headline statistics (1.1–1.6% of blockspace) drew attention precisely because they lacked a clear methodology and because, according to tracking, a significant share of recent illicit outflows moved through CoinJoin. Bottom line The debate is likely to intensify: privacy defenders will push back against any measures that restrict legitimate user privacy, while law enforcement and investigators will push for more accountability when services become conduits for large-scale theft. The question remains whether coordinators can — or should — police usage, and how the broader Bitcoin community will balance privacy rights against the risk of becoming a laundering tool for sophisticated attackers. Read more AI-generated news on: https://app.chaingpt.org/news
