I used to think a multisig problem was mainly about getting enough signatures.
Then I looked at what Dusk changed in its JubJub-Schnorr implementation.
One detail stood out: nonces are consumed once, while the multisignature state also checks the transcript and binds the key material and shares together.
That sounds like cryptographic housekeeping until you think about what the nonce actually represents.
It isn't just another value sitting inside a signature.
It's part of the state that makes that signing round valid.
So multisig isn't only asking:
“Did everyone sign?”
It's also asking whether those signatures belong to the same signing session, with the right keys and the right shares.
That changes the security question for me.
It's not enough to collect valid signatures.
The protocol has to know they're valid together.
@Dusk_Foundation
$DUSK #dusk
Then I looked at what Dusk changed in its JubJub-Schnorr implementation.
One detail stood out: nonces are consumed once, while the multisignature state also checks the transcript and binds the key material and shares together.
That sounds like cryptographic housekeeping until you think about what the nonce actually represents.
It isn't just another value sitting inside a signature.
It's part of the state that makes that signing round valid.
So multisig isn't only asking:
“Did everyone sign?”
It's also asking whether those signatures belong to the same signing session, with the right keys and the right shares.
That changes the security question for me.
It's not enough to collect valid signatures.
The protocol has to know they're valid together.
@Dusk_Foundation
$DUSK #dusk