#dusk $DUSK @Dusk
Dug into Dusk Network's Phoenix 2.0 spec and stopped on one detail: every Phoenix transaction includes the sender's address, encrypted, and only the recipient can decrypt it. Not conditional, not a leak — it's part of the transaction data itself, present on every single transfer.
For $DUSK, a chain marketed as privacy-preserving, that's worth sitting with. Phoenix hides amounts and balances from the public, but sender-receiver linkage isn't erased — it's just moved off the public ledger and encrypted straight to the counterparty. Dusk's own engineering notes describe this as the shift "from anonymity to privacy-preserving," done specifically to satisfy MiCA and AML disclosure rules for centralized exchanges. #dusk @Duskfoundation present it as compliance-by-design, not a workaround.
What changed for me was realizing "privacy" here was never meant to mean untraceable. It means hidden from the public ledger, visible to the one party who's owed that information under regulation. Most users skim past that distinction because "shielded" reads as "anonymous" everywhere else in crypto.
Next thing I'd check: whether that encrypted sender-address data persists once Phoenix notes convert into a Moonlight account, or gets discarded when value crosses into the fully public model.