Risk worth precise handling Dusk's own whitepaper names a specific incentive problem in its consensus design rather than leaving it undocumented.

Per the whitepaper this stems from the predictability of generators for all iterations within a single round. A higher iteration generator could theoretically benefit from earlier iterations failing clearing the path toward their own turn at the block reward. The risk doesn't require anyone acting maliciously. It comes from the incentive structure itself.

Documented mitigation runs across four separate mechanisms. Voter rewards give provisioners a reason to take the immediate more certain payout rather than betting on a future generator reward. Generator payout partly depends on including all known votes. The next iteration generator specifically gets excluded from voting. And a hard cap on total iterations limits how many future generator positions can even exist.

The gap worth naming honestly needing four separate mechanisms to address one incentive problem suggests it was never solvable with a single simple fix.

@Dusk_Foundation $DUSK
$APR
$BEAT
#dusk
Would you trust a consensus design that needs FOUR mechanisms to prevent one incentive attack?