Previously, I almost assumed that a large protocol only needed to have audits to be considered as having significantly reduced risks.
To build trust, we had to accept that security reports were enough to evaluate the level of safety.
I had become used to looking at most models that way.

Until I read Babylon’s Zellic audit report, there was one detail that made me stop and think.
What caught my attention was not the fact that there were findings in the audit,
but the way 32 findings, including 7 critical ones, were grouped together under the status “resolved or acknowledged”.
I had to read more about the audit process, how severity levels are classified, and the responsibility of publicly disclosing findings before realizing this issue was not as simple as I initially thought.

At first, I assumed that if a finding was mentioned in the report, the community would have enough information to evaluate the risk.
Then I realized the focus was not on whether a protocol had an audit or not,
but on how security issues are handled, made transparent and tracked
while users are still required to place their assets into the system.

From my current perspective, the real difference lies in the effort
to separate “fixed and verified again” from “known but accepted to remain”
instead of treating these two states as having the same level of safety.

That made me rethink the trust model.
Babylon seems to not only need to prove its technical design,
but also needs to change how the community evaluates risks in a system managing billions of dollars.
Responsibility is being separated again and the assumptions around trust are shifting along with it.

I still feel that I have not fully understood all the consequences of this design.
Perhaps the more important question is not “has this protocol been audited?”,
but “how much do we truly know about the risks that were found, what has been fixed and what still remains in the system?”.
@BabylonLabs_io #baby $BABY $memes $BLESS