Curve Finance revealed that an attacker siphoned roughly $38,200 in DAO revenue on November 10 by exploiting a logic flaw in its fee-conversion contract, running 138 unauthorized trades that diverted protocol fees to an external wallet. What happened - The exploit targeted Curve’s CowSwapBurner fee-conversion contract, which is used to sell accumulated protocol fees and convert them into crvUSD for distribution to the DAO. - A bug in the contract’s isValidSignature routine let fraudulent trade orders pass signature checks. The function validated a human-readable “order description” in the signature but failed to verify the actual order hash supplied by CoW Protocol. This allowed the attacker to pair a legitimate order description with wholly different transactions. - Because the burner had already granted CoW Protocol unlimited token allowances, the attacker could submit forged orders during the normal weekly trading window and redirect sale proceeds to their own address. Timeline and losses - The first forged trade settled at 00:07 UTC on November 10 — seven minutes after the weekly sale window opened. That transaction sold the burner’s YB token balance into USDC and sent proceeds to the attacker. - The attacker reused the same valid order description to authorize another 137 forged transactions across 135 tokens. By 00:24 UTC, 133 of the fraudulent orders had settled; the remaining five completed through 11:10 UTC the same day. - Curve says the attacker executed 138 forged orders and received 38,205.76 USDC (reported as roughly $38,200). In contrast, 36 legitimate orders across 35 tokens produced 97,317.74 crvUSD for the FeeCollector. - Most of the stolen balances were small: the median forged order was about $254, and only two forged orders exceeded the burner’s minimum sale threshold of 500 crvUSD. Funds movement after the exploit - Within four hours, the attacker swapped 37,611.76 USDC for ETH, split funds across four addresses, and bridged them to Arbitrum. - Around 37,229.89 USDC reached Hyperliquid and was exchanged for 65.41 XMR1 (a Monero-linked asset). Curve reported those balances remained untouched as of November 16. - On November 15 the attacker converted the remaining ~594 USDC into ETH and deposited 0.3 ETH into Tornado Cash. Scope and impact - Curve confirmed user deposits, lending markets and crvUSD holdings were not affected. The attacker targeted only accumulated administrative fee balances that the protocol had already collected. - Curve audited all 6,558 orders processed by the burner since it was deployed in June 2024 and identified the 138 unauthorized transactions as the only ones that didn’t deliver proceeds to the FeeCollector. Response and mitigation - After an external report on November 10, Curve’s Emergency DAO disabled fee collection and trading on Ethereum at 13:59 UTC; similar precautionary pauses followed on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC. Ethereum fee conversion remains paused while fees continue to accumulate. - On November 17 the Emergency DAO moved residual token balances from the old burner contracts on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum back to their FeeCollector contracts. - A governance proposal opened November 13 (closing November 20) seeks to replace the flawed burner with a descending-price auction mechanism that will verify the actual order hash, addressing the root cause of the signature check bypass. Context - Curve has faced other security incidents unrelated to this vulnerability: a May 2025 DNS hijack that forced a domain migration, and a March 2026 LlamaLend incident. Curve says those incidents did not involve the fee-conversion bug disclosed in November. Why this matters This exploit underscores how small logic errors in signature or order validation can be weaponized to steal protocol revenue even when user funds and markets are untouched. Granting unlimited allowances to third-party integrators — a common DeFi convenience — amplified the attack surface, enabling rapid, automated abuse during normal trading windows. The proposed auction-and-hash-verification fix aims to close that gap. Read more AI-generated news on: https://app.chaingpt.org/news