A proposed $38 billion settlement involving Visa and Mastercard has received preliminary court approval, but its practical effect for shoppers is more complicated than a simple promise of lower prices. The deal would lower average U.S. credit-card interchange rates modestly for five years and give merchants more discretion over which types of cards to accept or surcharge.

That changes the bargaining position at the checkout counter. It does not, however, require a merchant to reduce shelf prices, compel an issuer to cut rewards, or send a payment to consumers. Final court approval is still required.

The central consumer question is therefore not whether swipe fees fall in the abstract. It is how much of a limited reduction merchants retain, pass through in prices, or use to make payment methods—including premium rewards cards—less attractive at the point of sale.

The proposed five-year, 10-basis-point interchange reduction

The revised agreement, which covers more than 12 million merchants, was valued at $38 billion and received preliminary approval on June 9, 2026, according to Reuters. The case is not complete: preliminary approval is a step toward, not the same as, final approval.

Under the proposed terms, Visa and Mastercard would reduce the combined average effective U.S. credit-interchange rate by 10 basis points for five years. Standard consumer-credit interchange rates would also be capped at 125 basis points over the agreement’s term, according to Visa’s description of the settlement.

Ten basis points equals one-tenth of one percentage point. That is a real reduction, but it is deliberately modest relative to the scale of card-payment costs. Reuters reported that Visa and Mastercard swipe fees in the United States totaled $118.8 billion in 2025, with an average fee of 2.36%. Those totals had risen from $111.2 billion in 2024 and $25.6 billion in 2009.

For consumers, the distinction between an average-rate reduction and an across-the-board price cut matters. The agreement regulates part of the payment-cost structure. It does not dictate the price of groceries, restaurant meals, online purchases or any other goods and services. A merchant’s final price reflects many costs and competitive choices, not interchange alone.

How weaker Honor All Cards rules could change checkout choices

The more consequential provision may be operational rather than numerical. Merchants would receive greater flexibility to surcharge customers and to decide whether to accept commercial, premium-consumer or standard-consumer credit cards. In effect, the settlement would weaken the traditional Honor All Cards rule, under which acceptance of a network’s cards generally required broad acceptance of its credit products.

That does not mean a store could single out a particular bank’s card for rejection or impose a surcharge based on an individual issuer. The court noted that the proposed framework does not permit rejection or surcharging at the individual-issuer level. The choice is instead framed around categories of credit cards.

Still, category-level choice could matter in everyday spending. A business that believes premium cards impose a higher cost could decide not to take premium-consumer credit cards while continuing to accept standard consumer credit cards. A merchant could also use the expanded surcharging flexibility rather than refusing a card outright. The practical experience could be less uniform card acceptance, particularly at merchants that are highly sensitive to payment costs.

Whether that becomes common is unresolved. Payment acceptance is also a sales decision: refusing a customer’s preferred card can create friction, slow a transaction or send the customer elsewhere. The settlement gives merchants an option, not an instruction to use it. Large chains, small businesses and online sellers may make different calculations.

Why lower swipe fees do not automatically mean lower retail prices

The intuitive case is straightforward: if a merchant pays less to accept a card, it could charge the customer less. But “could” is doing important work. The settlement does not set a pass-through rule, and the supplied record does not establish how much, if any, savings merchants will return to customers through lower prices.

Merchants may use any reduction to offset other cost pressures, support margins, fund operations, compete selectively on price or pay for the administrative burden of changing payment practices. Competitive markets can create pressure to share savings with customers, but that is a market outcome, not a settlement term.

The reported fee figures also put the proposed cut in context. An average 2.36% swipe fee in 2025 is a broad measure, while the agreement’s 10-basis-point reduction is an average effective-rate change. It would be a mistake to translate that directly into a predicted percentage reduction in retail prices. Different businesses have different transaction mixes, card acceptance patterns and ability to pass costs on.

There is a further complication: some merchant and other objectors argued that the agreement would still leave merchants paying excessive fees. Reuters also reported that merchants may choose not to reject premium cards in practice. If businesses retain broad premium-card acceptance because customers expect it, the settlement’s new acceptance flexibility may have a narrower visible effect than its terms suggest.

For shoppers, the most plausible near-term changes to watch are therefore at checkout: notices about card surcharges, requests to use another payment method, or differing acceptance of card categories. Lower posted prices are possible, but they are not guaranteed by preliminary approval or by the interchange cap.

Swipe Fee Settlement Balancing Prices and Credit Card Rewards

Premium rewards cards face indirect pressure, not an ordered rewards cut

Premium rewards cards sit at the center of the settlement’s consumer trade-off. The agreement specifically puts premium-consumer cards among the categories merchants could choose not to accept. That makes rewards-heavy cards more exposed to a possible acceptance gap than standard consumer credit cards, at least where a merchant decides the economics justify the change.

The second pressure is indirect. Interchange revenue helps fund card-issuer economics, and lower interchange can reduce the revenue available to issuers. In a competitive card market, issuers could respond in a variety of ways, including reassessing rewards structures or other card economics. But that is a scenario, not a term of the settlement.

Nothing in the agreement directly requires a card issuer to reduce points, cash back, travel benefits or other rewards. Cardholders should be wary of claims that a rewards devaluation has already been ordered. The observed facts are narrower: merchants would have a new ability to decline premium-consumer cards, and the rate changes can create pressure on the revenue that supports rewards.

That distinction is useful for spending decisions. A card’s advertised earning rate is only valuable where the card is accepted and where the rewards program retains its terms. Consumers who rely heavily on a premium card may want a viable backup payment method for merchants that surcharge or decline a particular credit-card category. That is an operational precaution, not a prediction that broad non-acceptance will occur.

The $5.54 billion historical damages fund is not a consumer refund

The $38 billion proposed rules settlement should not be confused with the separate $5.54 billion damages settlement associated with historical payment-card transactions. The official Payment Card Settlement website says that damages case concerns transactions from January 1, 2004, through January 25, 2019.

Eligible merchants—not consumers—can receive payments from that damages fund. It is backward-looking compensation for the covered historical period, whereas the newer proposed settlement concerns forward-looking interchange and card-acceptance rules.

For consumers, that separation is more than a legal detail. There is no described consumer refund from the $5.54 billion fund, and no automatic retail-price rebate from the proposed five-year interchange changes. The durable effect of the newer agreement, if finally approved, may be a more visible negotiation over payment costs at checkout: merchants can gain leverage over premium-card acceptance, while consumers may gain lower prices only where businesses decide that passing savings on is worth doing.