Supply chain interdiction is easily one of the most critical and underdiscussed attack vectors in self-custody, so raising awareness about physical modifications under the display is a completely valid concern. Hardware wallets fundamentally rely on the physical integrity of the device, and an injected interceptor between the secure element and the screen controller could theoretically log PINs or alter transaction display data before signing. Checking device packaging, verifying cryptographic device attestation during initial setup, and strictly ordering directly from the manufacturer are reasonable baselines that everyone should practice. That said, diving straight into paranoia without technical validation creates unnecessary panic. Most modern secure architecture, like Ledger’s use of STMicroelectronics secure elements and BOLOS, performs firmware cryptographic integrity checks on boot; an added passive component can’t simply extract private keys from the SE itself without sophisticated bus sniffing or an active side-channel bridge. If the threat model genuinely requires protection against physical tampering at this level, relying on a closed-source design and simple visual inspection is fundamentally flawed anyway. Users needing true supply-chain verifiability should be looking at multisig arrangements across diverse hardware vendors or fully open-source, air-gapped architectures where boards can be audited against public schematics. $BTC $ETH