A locksmith friend once told me the hardest locks to pick arent the ones with more pins — theyre the ones where changing even one pin invalidates the whole mechanism, not just that pin. I assumed Dusk's Phoenix proofs guarded against the obvious things — ownership, balance, double-spend — and malleability was someone-else's-problem, handled elsewhere in the stack.
That assumption fell apart once I found Dusk's own formal security-proof paper for Phoenix.
It states directly: Dusk published security-models and proofs covering non-malleability, ledger-indistinguishability, and balance-plus-note-spendability, all as properties Phoenix satisfies together, not as separate bolt-on checks. Malleability-protection means a transaction cant be altered after-the-fact and still pass as the same valid proof — someone intercepting a broadcast transaction cant tweak it and resubmit a modified version that still verifies.
Worth naming what makes this genuinely rare: the same paper states Zcash attempted a similar formal-security-approach for their own transaction-model and ultimately abandoned it. Dusk's materials describe Phoenix as the first privacy-preserving transaction-model to ship complete security-proofs across all these properties together.
The real test for DUSK is whether that formal-proof-coverage holds up as Phoenix 2.0 development, mentioned in the same update for MiCA-compliance reasons, changes the underlying implementation.
Does a formally-proven non-malleability guarantee matter more to you than one that's simply never been broken in practice?
#dusk $DUSK @Dusk
That assumption fell apart once I found Dusk's own formal security-proof paper for Phoenix.
It states directly: Dusk published security-models and proofs covering non-malleability, ledger-indistinguishability, and balance-plus-note-spendability, all as properties Phoenix satisfies together, not as separate bolt-on checks. Malleability-protection means a transaction cant be altered after-the-fact and still pass as the same valid proof — someone intercepting a broadcast transaction cant tweak it and resubmit a modified version that still verifies.
Worth naming what makes this genuinely rare: the same paper states Zcash attempted a similar formal-security-approach for their own transaction-model and ultimately abandoned it. Dusk's materials describe Phoenix as the first privacy-preserving transaction-model to ship complete security-proofs across all these properties together.
The real test for DUSK is whether that formal-proof-coverage holds up as Phoenix 2.0 development, mentioned in the same update for MiCA-compliance reasons, changes the underlying implementation.
Does a formally-proven non-malleability guarantee matter more to you than one that's simply never been broken in practice?
#dusk $DUSK @Dusk