Good reminder that validator security is also about blast radius. If one credential gets compromised, separation can keep signing access from becoming withdrawal access. $BOME$MAGMA$USELESS
Shobi-crypto
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#dusk $DUSK @Dusk Yesterday I was setting up a Dusk provisioner node, expecting the hard part to be hardware or syncing. Instead, the wallet setup made me pause.
The docs present a choice. One key signs blocks and votes — the consensus key, living on your server, exposed to the internet. The owner key/address can unstake and withdraw the stake, meant to stay separate from the node.
You can run one key for both. Simple. But if your node gets breached, that single credential gives the attacker everything. With a separate owner key, a compromised node or consensus key cannot unstake or withdraw the stake; Dusk recommends keeping the owner key secure and, ideally, not storing the mnemonic on the server.
I used to think more keys meant more friction. Now I'm wondering whether convenience is the real risk.
Does splitting these roles actually make validators safer, or just give operators one more thing to misplace? $AVAAI $ONG
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